The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Council of Ministers' 96th Ordinary Session in Freetown did not include a structured analytical assessment of terrorism and violent extremism. This omission occurred despite West Africa and the Sahel being the global epicentre of terrorist activities. The regional body's agenda revealed a significant gap in its approach to pressing security challenges.
The Freetown agenda listed 28 items, with 13 focused on institutional administration and six on economic integration. These included budget execution, staff recruitment, trade liberalisation, and the single currency programme. Only one item, the negotiation with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), indirectly touched upon the active security crisis. This structure suggests a fundamental misalignment between ECOWAS's stated mandate and its operational priorities.
This analytical deficit is particularly concerning given the current security landscape. Three ECOWAS member states are effectively partitioned by armed non-state actors. Four coastal member states have recorded attacks in their northern territories. Jihadist territorial expansion has consistently moved southward for over a decade. The lack of a dedicated security threat assessment item on the agenda indicates a missing national and regional intelligence function.
An assessment of the session highlighted that ECOWAS failed to produce or act on forward-looking intelligence assessments of security threats. This contrasts sharply with its robust approach to food security. Item 19, concerning the Agropastoral Outlook, projected 51.9 million people facing acute food insecurity by August 2026. This assessment, produced by PREGEC, led to immediate action, including mobilising the Regional Food Security Reserve.
The success of PREGEC demonstrates that ECOWAS possesses the capacity for structured, intelligence-driven analysis. PREGEC collects data, uses validated modelling, and delivers forward-looking projections to decision-makers. However, no equivalent analytical body exists for security threats. This absence means there is no regular, evidence-based security threat assessment delivered to the Council of Ministers.
The analytical gap also impacts diplomatic efforts, such as negotiations with the AES countries. While a risk register was developed for these negotiations, it focuses on diplomatic failures, not the underlying security risks. This approach overlooks the most critical threats facing the region. The Council extended the chief negotiator's mandate through December 2026, but without a clear security intelligence picture.
This situation implies that ECOWAS may not be directing its efforts at the most critical problems. The lack of an integrated analytical picture could hinder effective responses to terrorism and instability. Decision-makers and regional partners will be watching to see if ECOWAS can bridge this intelligence gap. Addressing this deficit is crucial for regional stability and economic development.
The continued focus on administrative and economic matters, while important, overshadows the urgent need for security intelligence. Without a dedicated mechanism to assess and forecast security threats, ECOWAS risks being reactive rather than proactive. This could have long-term implications for the safety and prosperity of its member states. The region requires a strategic shift towards integrated security analysis.