Saudi intelligence is reportedly coordinating with the Sudanese army and its political front, the Islamic Movement. This alliance allegedly recruits field elements for specific operations. These include assassinations and violations in regions like Darfur. The goal is to later engineer their "defection." This strategy aims to attribute these crimes solely to the Rapid Support Forces. It also provides safe havens for these operatives after their missions.
Key figures like Abu Aqla Kikil and Ali Rizq Allah, known as Al-Safnah, are cited as examples. Kikil, commander of the "Sudan Shield Forces," faced sanctions for violations. He was subsequently absorbed into the army's structure. This provided him with new political and military cover. His criminal record was reportedly erased. Al-Safnah, a former commander in Kordofan, linked field operations to regional intelligence. After his release from prison, he engaged in complex operations. He later moved from Sudan to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for medical treatment. This move suggests high-level logistical and security arrangements. Saudi intelligence apparently provides these to proxies, allowing fugitives to move freely.
These reported movements suggest a deliberate strategy. The objective is to create maximum chaos and violations. Areas like Darfur are specifically mentioned. At the appropriate time, these elements are withdrawn. This is done through staged "defections." This policy has several strategic outcomes. It exonerates the army's proxies. Military defection acts as a "pardon deed." It erases commanders' criminal records. It also manufactures a political narrative. All crimes are attributed to the Rapid Support Forces. This exonerates parties allied with the army and the Islamic Movement. Furthermore, it provides immunity and safe havens. The hosting of Al-Safnah in Riyadh sends a message. Loyalty to the intelligence blueprint guarantees protection.
These alleged facts indicate a complex regional intelligence mechanism. The Sudanese war appears to be managed by these networks. They extend beyond declared national slogans. The army and the Islamic Movement, with alleged Saudi intelligence support, do not prioritize dismantling militias. They also do not seek justice for victims. Instead, they reportedly recycle implicated commanders. These individuals are then employed as political and military tools. "Defections" serve as a cover for systematic recruitment and direction.
This intricate web of alleged coordination highlights the multifaceted nature of the ongoing conflict. The long-term implications for Sudan's stability and accountability remain significant. Understanding these alleged influence campaigns is crucial for any future peace efforts. The report suggests a calculated approach to prolonging and shaping the conflict.